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DISORDER IN THE COURT: THE USE OF
PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY IN THE PREDICTION
OF DANGEROUSNESS
MATTHEW LAFOND†

ABSTRACT
Preventive detention measures in Canada were implemented in order to
protect us from the most dangerous individuals in society. The Dangerous
In order to justify such drastic action, psychiatric assessments are
conducted in an attempt to determine who, among the “worst” offenders,
would be most likely to commit a dangerous offence in the future. This
paper will review the dangerous offender system in Canada, and in that
context, critically reconsider the ability of mental health professionals
to predict the risk of future dangerousness. Despite widespread
disagreement concerning evaluation methods and the fallibility of the
most common assessment tools, sentencing courts rely heavily upon
expert opinions. Given this uncertainty, however, psychiatric testimony
should be used cautiously, and only as a supplement to the court’s own
assessment. Recommendations are presented for making the most of
current techniques, and to protect those who may otherwise become
victims of “disorder in the court.”

†

Matthew Lafond (B.A. (Hons.), Queen’s) received his LL.B. from Dalhousie Law School in
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“Dangerousness,” according to Steven Yannoulidis, “is a subjective
concept, which is attributed to individuals taking account of calculable
actuarial risk and the subjective fear which they invoke.”1 For decades,
however, mental health experts have attempted to objectify dangerousness, in order to make it amenable to measurement, and ideally, control.
Preventive detention provisions exist to protect society from those
offenders who present an intolerably high risk to public safety. The legislation requires that those declared dangerous offenders be given indeterminate sentences. In reaching a conclusion regarding the dangerousness of an offender, the court will hear the testimony of a psychiatric
expert, who conducts an assessment in an attempt to predict the individual’s risk of committing dangerous acts in the future.
This paper will survey the dangerous offender system in Canada,
Criminal Code provisions that create it, and then
by presenting an overview of the jurisprudence surrounding the constitutionality and interpretation of this legislation. This will emphasize
sions.
Next, there will be a description of the most popular techniques used
by psychiatrists to arrive at their conclusions. A critical examination of
empirically robust measure, the Hare Psychopathy Checklist⎯Revised,
Finally, there will be a review of the research, which suggests that
because psychiatric assessments offer only a precarious solution to a
ing hearings should be limited to supplementing (and not replacing) the
court’s judgement of an offender’s prospects. The result is several recommendations that may be implemented to reduce the prevalence of
error and maximize the usefulness of available information.

1

Steven T. Yannoulidis, “Negotiating ‘Dangerousness’: Charting a Course Between Psychiatry
and Law” (2002) 9 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 151 at 155.
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I. THE DANGEROUS OFFENDER AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION
mended in 1895 by the Gladstone Committee on Prisons in England,
in order to segregate “for long periods of detention” a group of habitual offenders for whom regular punishment was inadequate.2 The term
the perception of a high risk of future criminality. In Canada, the use of
preventive detention has been expanding, and includes the dangerous
offender provisions, long-term offender provisions, and the use of annual recognizances.
Determining whether the appropriate sentence in a given case is life
imprisonment or preventive detention may be problematic. Manson sugtal, especially in the context of previous offences, making public safety
the foremost consideration.3 On the other hand, when a psychological
assessment suggests continuing dangerousness, but the current offence
does not itself justify a life sentence, the result should be a dangerous
offender designation. A dangerous offender application is intended for
the particular group of very dangerous people from whom the public
needs to be protected.4
1.

The Dangerous Offender in Canada

The current dangerous offender regime was originally enacted in 1977,5
largely in response to the recommendation of the Ouimet Committee,
which examined the cases of eighty habitual offenders detained on the
basis of the extant system.6 The Committee concluded that almost 40%
2

Andrew Forrester, “Preventive Detention, Public Protection and Mental Health” (2002) 13
Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 329. Forrester notes that it wasn’t until 1908 that such additional
sentences became law. The legislation didn’t work then, and, Forrester claims “if history can be
considered to predict the future, we can surely expect resounding failure” of future preventive
detention regimes (at 341).
3

Allan Manson, The Law of Sentencing (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 314.

4

See R. v. Neve (1999), 137 C.C.C. (3d) 97, [1999] 11 W.W.R. 649 (Alta. C.A.) [Neve cited to
C.C.C.].

5
6

Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1977, S.C. 1976-77, c. 53, s. 14.

Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, Toward Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1969).
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of their subjects did not represent a serious threat to public safety. It sug-

noting concerns with the ability to predict future dangerousness generally.
In 1997, Bill C-55 revised the dangerous offender provisions.7 The
government dubbed the Bill its “high-risk offender” legislation. It added
a dangerous offender be given an indeterminate sentence, and provided
for judicial restraint by allowing controls to be placed on high-risk individuals.8
The relevant provisions are set out in Part XXIV of the Criminal
Code,9
rious personal injury offence,” which is either a sexual assault, or an
indictable offence punishable by more than ten years imprisonment involving violence or danger to life, safety, or psychological well-being.10
If the prosecutor has grounds to believe that the offender might be found
to be a dangerous (or long-term) offender, there may be an application
752.1 (1) Application for remand for assessment—Where an
offender is convicted of a serious personal injury offence or an
offence referred to in paragraph 753.1(2)(a) and, before sentence is
imposed on the offender, on application by the prosecution, the court
7

An Act to amend the Criminal Code (high risk offenders), the Corrections and Conditional
Release Act, the Criminal Records Act, the Prisons and Reformatories Act and the Department
of the Solicitor General Act, S.C. 1997, c. 17, ss. 4-8.
8

See Department of Justice, News Release, “Bill C-55 Comes into Force” (21 July 1997),
online: Department of Justice Canada <http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/1997/c55com.
html>.
9

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.

10

murder, involving:
(i) the use or attempted use of violence against another person, or

and for which the offender may be sentenced to imprisonment for ten years or more, or
(b) an offence or attempt to commit an offence mentioned in section 271 (sexual assault), 272
(sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm) or 273 (aggravated sexual assault).
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is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
offender might be found to be a dangerous offender under section
753 or a long-term offender under section 753.1, the court may, by
order in writing remand the offender, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, to the custody of the person that the court directs and who
can perform an assessment, or can have an assessment performed by
experts. The assessment is to be used as evidence in an application
under sections 753 or 753.1.
(2) Report—The person to whom the offender is remanded shall
days after the end of the assessment period and make copies of it
available to the prosecutor and counsel for the offender.

The application by the prosecutor for a remand for up to sixty days to
victed, but not yet sentenced,11 of a personal injury offence or an offence
under s. 753.1(2)(a);12 and second, that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the offender might receive one of the designations. This
single, court-approved assessment replaced the previous requirement
that each party retain their own psychiatrist to tender evidence at a hearing.13
are a number of procedural requirements outlined in section 754 that

11

There is an exception to this in s. 753(2), which allows an application to be made after a sentence has been imposed, if the offender was given notice of this possibility prior to sentencing,
the application is commenced within six months of sentencing, and it is shown that there is relevant evidence that was not reasonably available to the prosecution at the time of the sentencing
which has since become available.

12

This section lists the potential offences leading to a long-term offender designation, and consists of several sexual offences.

13

See Manson, supra note 3 at 321-22. The author notes that this single assessment process
presents several problems not considered by the Task Force on High-Risk Violent Offenders,
who recommended the change. First, not every Canadian jurisdiction has at its disposal a multirecommendation was based on observations of the apparently liberal methods used by Dutch
mental health professionals. Manson suggests that their Canadian counterparts are usually more
guarded and conservative. He also seems to imply that since provincial mental health facilities
often have problems hiring staff, those working in them may be less capable than some of their
colleagues, and is therefore concerned about the enormous power vested in them by s. 752.1.
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14

Section 753(1) outlines
the test to be used in determining if an offender is a dangerous offender,
and consists of two branches.
lent indictable offence punishable by at least ten years imprisonment.
life, safety, or physical or mental well-being of other persons,” through
failing to restrain behaviour and a likelihood of causing death or injury;
persistent aggressive behaviour showing indifference to the reasonably
foreseeable consequences of behaviour; or acts “of such a brutal nature
as to compel the conclusion that the offender’s behaviour in the future is
unlikely to be inhibited by normal standards of behavioural restraint.”15
The second branch applies where there has been a conviction for
“failure to control his or her sexual impulses,” and that there is a likelihood that he will cause “injury, pain or other evil to other persons
through failure in the future to control…sexual impulses.”16
the likelihood of threat), the judge may label the offender a “dangerous
offender.”17 In R. v. Lyons,18 the Supreme Court noted that the judge
does retain some discretion, and Neve19 emphasized the importance of
accommodating particular factors in each individual’s case. Most recently, in R. v. Johnson,20
judge retains the discretion not to make the declaration where the goal
of protecting the public could be met by imposing a less restrictive sanction.
If a dangerous offender designation is imposed, an indeterminate
sentence is mandatory.21 An appellate court may overturn the designa14

Consent of the provincial attorney general (s. 754(1)(a)), and seven days notice by the prosecutor to the offender outlining the basis for the application (s. 754(1)(b)). Section 754 (2) speci-

15

Criminal Code, supra note 9 at ss. 753(1)(a)(i)-(iii).

16

Supra note 9 at s. 753(1)(b).

17

Supra note 9 at s. 753(1).

18

[1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, 89 N.S.R. (2d) 271[Lyons cited to S.C.R.].

19

Supra note 4.

20

[2003] 2 S.C.R. 357, 230 D.L.R. (4th) 296 [Johnson].

21

Criminal Code, supra note 9 at s. 753(4).
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board will review the case “as soon as possible after the expiration of
seven years” from the date of the arrest, and then every two years thereafter, to determine whether parole is appropriate.22 The protection offered by this provision is slight, however, as Professor Manson notes
that between 1987 and 1992, 98.5% of applications for full parole by
dangerous offenders were rejected.23
2.

The Constitutionality of the Dangerous Offender Provisions

i)

R. v. Lyons

the dangerous offender provisions in Lyons.24 The offender was sixteen
years old when he was charged with break-and-enter. He waived his
preliminary inquiry and pleaded guilty. The Crown commenced a dangerous offender application, and the trial judge concluded that the requirements had been met, since Lyons had a “sociopathic personality.”
In the Supreme Court, it was argued that the indeterminate sentence
provisions of the Criminal Code infringed Charter25 sections 7, 9, 11,
and 12. La Forest J., writing for the majority, began by describing the
dangerous offender process as one in which an indeterminate sentence
fence. It was not based simply on “fears or suspicions about…criminal
proclivities.”26
It is clear that the indeterminate detention is intended to serve both
punitive and preventative purposes. Both are legitimate aims of the
criminal sanction…. Part XXI [now Part XXIV] merely enables the
court to accommodate its sentence to the common sense reality that
the present condition of the offender is such that he or she is not
22

Supra note 9 at s. 761(1).

23

Manson, supra note 3 at 328.

24

Supra note 18.

25

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].

26

Supra note 18 at para. 24.
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inhibited by normal standards of behavioural restraint so that future
27

He concluded that the provisions did not violate a principle of fundamental justice, nor did they violate section 7 of the Charter.
La Forest J. next considered whether the provisions constituted cruel and unusual punishment under section 12 of the Charter. He engaged
in a gross-disproportionality analysis, asking whether indeterminate
detention is unusually severe, and whether the severe sentence serves
any additional penological purpose. He concluded that the scheme was
appropriately tailored to its target group, and effectively accomplished
its goals. The indeterminacy of the sentence was saved by the existence
of the parole process, which he claimed “ensures that incarceration is
imposed for only as long as the circumstances…require.”28 As Manson
noted, La Forest J. was not troubled by the fact that the parole criteria
29
tion.
La Forest J. next dismissed arguments under section 9 of the Charter
that the scheme constituted arbitrary detention. He stated simply that “in
no sense of the word can the imprisonment resulting from the successful invocation of Part XXI be considered ‘arbitrary’.”30 He stated that
prescribes the conditions under which they may receive the designation.
Thus, there is no element of arbitrariness.
Another challenge was mounted with respect to section 11(f), which
31

Dangerous offender hearings are conducted by judge alone. La Forest J.
decided that because the dangerous offender application was not a new
charge, but part of the sentencing process, section 11 did not apply.
27

Supra note 18 at para. 27.

28

Supra note 18 at para. 49. But see the discussion above, supra note 23 and accompanying
text.
29

Supra note 3 at 331. Manson argues that this is the weakest part of the Lyons decision, being detention. He also argues that as dangerous offenders spend increasing amounts of time
problem.
30

Supra note 18 at para. 61.

31

Charter, supra note 25.
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In considering whether the use of psychiatric testimony was fundamentally unfair because of its uncertainty,32 La Forest J. distinguished
between infallibility and relevance. He wrote: “Indeed, inherent in the
notion of dangerousness is the risk, not the certainty, of harm.”33 He
acknowledged the concerns of Isabel Grant when she wrote that “surely
if we add ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ to a ‘future likelihood’ the sum
total can be no greater than a balance of probabilities;”34 but reminded
us that the basis of law is not logic, but experience. “The most that can
be established in a future context is a likelihood of certain events occurring. To doubt this conclusion is…to doubt the validity of the legislative
objectives embodied in Part XXI.”35 Furthermore, La Forest J. asserted
that the test of dangerousness has been met (that there exists a certain
potential for harm), without assuming an ability to predict the future.
“[P]sychiatric evidence,” the Court claimed, “is clearly relevant to the
issue whether a person is likely to behave in a certain way and, indeed,
is probably relatively superior in this regard to the evidence of other
clinicians and lay persons.”36 In support of this statement, La Forest J.
cited an article written by a leading forensic mental health professional
and a criminologist.37
In considering the problem of “false positives,” that is, the erroneous over-prediction of future violence, La Forest J. wrote: “This problem does not appear to undermine the utility and fairness of the scheme
so much as to fortify the conclusion that the procedural protections accorded the offender, especially on review, ought to be very rigorous.”
He indicated that the scheme balances alternative risks: the risk of harm
to potential victims and the risk of unnecessarily detaining offenders
judged to be dangerous. Since the offender is “in the wrong by the virtue
32

See discussion of the use of psychiatric assessments of dangerousness, infra.

33

Supra note 18 at para. 92.

34

Isabel Grant, “Dangerous Offenders” (1985) 9 Dal. L.J. 347 at 360.

35

Supra note 18 at para. 93.

36

Supra note 18 at para. 97.

37

See Robert J. Menzies, Christopher D. Webster & Diana S. Sepejak, “The Dimensions of
Dangerousness: Evaluating the Accuracy of Psychometric Predictions of Violence Among Forensic Patients” (1985) 9 Law and Human Behavior 49, cited by La Forest J. in Lyons, supra
note 18 at para. 97.
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of unnecessary measures.”38
ii)

Supreme Court Jurisprudence Since Lyons

Lyons in R.
v. Jones, which was a challenge based on sections 7 and 10(b) of the
Charter to Mr. Jones’s dangerous offender designation.
In November 1986, the appellant was charged with three counts of
39

to election, the appellant’s counsel obtained a court order under what
was then section 537(1)(b) of the Criminal Code40 for a remand to custody for observation to determine whether the accused was sane and
institution examined Jones. He was not told that during the 30-day remand, the focus shifted to the determination of an opinion on whether
he was a dangerous offender. The doctors concluded he was extremely
dangerous and likely to re-offend. The appellant pleaded guilty, and
following his conviction, a dangerous offender hearing was held. The
Crown attempted to make use of the reports that the clinicians prepared
during Jones’s remand, but the defence argued that to admit the results
of pre-trial psychiatric exams without the consent or warning of the accused would violate section 7. Additionally, it was claimed that the accused’s section 10(b) right to counsel was violated when he was not
advised that his assessments included observations regarding his future
dangerousness.
In his majority opinion, Gonthier J. referred to the case of R. v.
Wilband,41 where the Court concluded that the rules of evidence regarding hearsay and confessions did not apply to dangerous sex offender
proceedings, because as a form of sentencing, guilt had already been established. Similarly, in R. v. Langevin,42 it was held that neither section
7 nor section 11(c) guaranteed a right to be warned against the possible
38

Supra note 18 at para. 100.

39

[1994] 2 S.C.R. 229, (1994) 89 C.C.C. (3d) 353 [Jones cited to S.C.R.].

40

Supra note 9.

41

[1967] S.C.R. 14, [1967] 2 C.C.C. 6.

42

(1984), 39 C.R. (3d) 333, 45 O.R. (2d) 705 (C.A.).
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use of statements made during an initial psychiatric examination in subsequent dangerous offender hearings. Gonthier J. wrote:
I cannot agree with the characterization…that the results of the
psychiatric observation are used to “incriminate” the accused at his
dangerous offender proceedings…. By the time the accused reaches
the dangerous offender proceeding state, he has already been found
culpable of the offence for which he was charged.43

characterized as a new trial, and thus were not afforded the same procedural protections. In noting that section 7 was not violated, the Court
acknowledged that while these protections extended to the pre-trial period, “statements volunteered by an accused to an agent of the state will
not infringe an accused’s section 7 right to silence.”44 Jones was not
“tricked” into making statements. In fact, he was warned the statements
might be used against him in court. Gonthier J. also noted that “in the
case of dangerous offender proceedings, it is all the more important that
the court be given access to the widest possible range of information in
order to determine whether there is a serious risk to public safety.”45 To
might hinder the effective determination of the true risk posed by the
offender. It was ordered that the evidence emerging from the evaluation
be admitted.46
The section 10(b) argument was also rejected. Since the Crown was
not under an obligation to notify the accused of its intention to make a
dangerous offender application prior to a plea being entered, there was
no reason that the doctors should have been required to provide such a
warning.
Interestingly, Gonthier J. stressed that “[a]n indeterminate sentence
is not an unlimited sentence…. The offender faces incarceration only
for the period of time that he poses a serious risk to the safety of so-

43

Jones, supra note 39 at para. 27.

44

Supra note 39 at para. 36.

45

Supra note 39 at para. 45.

46

There was a strong dissent of four judges, who concluded that the rule against self-incrimination applied even if dangerous offender hearings are characterized as a form of sentencing.
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ciety.”47 This notion was also conveyed in Lyons,48 where La Forest J.
referred to the parole process as a legitimizing factor. However, these
decisions preceded the changes in Bill C-55,49 which increased the initial period of parole ineligibility from three years to seven, and every
two years thereafter.50 There is no guarantee that the parole board has
the capacity (or the will) to accurately reassess the continuing risk for
dangerousness.
iii)

Developments in Lower Courts

The decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court in R. v. Brown51
upheld the Criminal Code provisions authorizing the sixty-day remand
for psychiatric assessments for dangerous offender applications.52 Smith
J. held that there was no violation of Charter rights, because society’s
interest in protecting against future risk outweighed the offender’s right
against self-incrimination. However, an offender could not be punished
for refusing to participate in the assessment, and this refusal should not
lead to an adverse inference.

under the previous section 756. Yet, she wrote:
Previously, assessments of this nature were often informal and
unstructured, and frequently resulted in opinions that were more
impressionistic than reliable. The strategic structural guidelines
now used have been found to increase the level of accuracy in an
assessment’s prediction of an offender’s risk of future violence.53

She later noted that “‘observation’ under the old regime is negligibly
different from ‘assessment’ under the new regime. In effect, no practical
difference may be ascertained.”54 It is unfortunate that Smith J. did not
47

Jones, supra note 39 at para. 45.

48

Supra note 18.

49

Supra note 7.

50

Criminal Code, supra note 9 at s. 761(1).

51

(2000), 142 B.C.A.C. 151.

52

Supra note 9 at s. 752.1(1).

53

Brown, supra note 51 at para. 12.

54

Supra note 51 at para. 28.
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take this opportunity to forcefully foreclose the possibility of utilizing
any obsolete techniques in the new assessments, even after recognizing
their weaknesses.
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal took a stronger stance in R. v.
J.T.H.55 Freeman J.A., writing for the court, urged judges to give greater
weight to empirically-based actuarial studies than to clinical observation
in deciding whether to designate someone a dangerous offender.56 The
accused pleaded guilty to charges of sexual and indecent assault. The
Crown had relied on two experts with opposite opinions. Dr. Aquino,
head of the Provincial Forensic Psychiatric Service, observed and interviewed the accused during a 30-day remand and concluded that there
was a substantial risk he would re-offend, based on his history of deviant sexual impulses. On the other hand, Dr. Kelln, a clinical and forensic
psychologist, conducted tests based on actuarial screening tools. These
scores are based on interviews, the offender’s history, and the nature of
his crimes. The results of these tests put the accused at a “moderate”
risk of recidivism. Dr. Kelln claimed these tests were “state of the art,”
and superior to clinical assessment. The defence psychologist agreed.
Freeman J.A. wrote:

Even though the data bases forming the foundations of the actuarial

may account for the special status accorded assessments performed
by experts in s. 752.1.57

55

(2002), 170 C.C.C. (3d) 405, 2002 NSCA 138.

56

“Deliberating on Dangerousness and Death: Jurors’ Ability to Differentiate Between Expert
Actuarial and Clinical Predictions of Dangerousness” (2003) 26 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 113. The

after cross-examination on the testimony. The same effect might hold for judges.
57

Supra note 55 at para. 30.
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when such test results show the risk of re-offending to be in the “high”
range, or more than 50%. The accused’s dangerous offender status was
overturned.
In Neve,58 the accused appealed a designation as a dangerous offender. She was a prostitute from the age of 12, and had several convictions,
both as a young offender and adult, none of which involved a serious
away her clothing, and drove away. The trial judge concluded that Neve
was not a psychopath, but gave her an indeterminate sentence because
she did not intend to change her lifestyle or accept treatment.
The Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, but overturned
the dangerous offender designation. The Court held that it was unreasonable to sentence Neve as a dangerous offender, as she had a short
criminal record for violence, and she did not “fall within that very small
group that Parliament intended be designated as dangerous offenders.”59
To meet the test, there must be a pattern of repetitive violent or aggressive behaviour from which it is possible to conclude that the offender
is a serious risk to others. The focus is on past conduct, not character.
The Court suggested a three-part process, which considers prospects for
treatment, the seriousness of the criminal conduct, and the offender’s
circumstances.60
The Court also made the noteworthy observation that “[t]he problem
with all this [expert testimony] is that the doctors may have little idea
what any of these [legal] terms mean. And yet, obviously, their opinions
will be based on whatever interpretation they give to those terms.”61
Furthermore, it was suggested that “[t]o assist the psychiatrists in giving
opinions on what a pattern reveals, both in terms of past conduct and
58

Supra note 4.

59

Supra note 4 at para. 3.

60

See also R. v. George (1998), 126 C.C.C. (3d) 384 (B.C.C.A.). George pleaded guilty to
manslaughter for killing a 79-year-old man by beating him in the face with a rock. He was an
aboriginal person who was likely born with fetal alcohol syndrome and had a low IQ. The Court
allowed his appeal from a dangerous offender designation. The killing was markedly different
from the other incidents in George’s history, and the trial judge erred in considering his childhood behaviour as evidence of an aggressive pattern. The social realities of the accused’s background necessitated the differentiation between childhood aggression and adult criminality.

61

Supra note 4 at para. 206.
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future dangerousness, it would be advantageous if the key elements of
the pattern were put to them.”62
3. The Impact of Dangerousness in Sentencing the Mentally
Disordered Offender
The following cases did not involve a dangerous offender application,
but instead discussed mental disorder and the Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) defence. However, they are relevant for consideration here because of their discussion of the impact of dangerousness on sentencing.
Many of the factors relevant to the court in the NCR context may have
light of the focus on personal circumstances mandated by Neve. There
cumstances or prospects of those who are “dangerous” because they are
considered mentally ill, and those who are “dangerous” as a result of
being labelled such by the court.
In Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute),63 the
accused had a long history of mental illness, and had been diagnosed
with chronic residual schizophrenia. He was arrested in 1983 for attacking two individuals on the street. At trial, he was found NCR, and a
conditional discharge was ordered under section 672.54 of the Criminal
Code.64 The accused challenged the constitutionality of the provisions
of the Code dealing with the review of NCR accused.
The majority held that Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code created a
new alternative for NCR defendants, allowing an individualized assessment to determine whether the person poses a continuing threat to society, with an emphasis on providing treatment. Section 672.54 does not
create a presumption of dangerousness, and should not impose a burden
of proving lack of dangerousness on the accused. A Review Board must
62

Supra note 4 at para. 207. See also Fenna H. Poletiek, “How Psychiatrists and Judges Assess the Dangerousness of Persons with Mental Illness: An ‘Expertise Bias’” (2002) 20 Behav.

63
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 625, [1999] S.C.J. No. 31 [Winko]. See also R. v. LePage, [1999] 2 S.C.R.
744 (Winko’s companion case).

64

Supra note 9.
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direct an absolute discharge if it believes that the accused is not a sigthe criminal law may restrict the liberty of an NCR accused is the protecThis procedure differs markedly from that used in dangerous offender proceedings, in that if the NCR accused is
threat to safety, the Board may order that the accused be discharged

Besides the difference in moral culpability for committing the offence,65
it is not clear why this difference should exist. In both cases, the primary
concern is said to be protecting the public from potential harm. Given
that the NCR accused presents the same potential risk, they should presumably be subject to the same restrictions. Winko also directs Review
Boards to make the least onerous orders possible considering both the
need to protect society from danger, and the personal needs of the accused.66 The fact is that those receiving the much more restrictive dangerous offender designation also have unique psychological and social
needs that are deserving of special attention, perhaps more so, because
In R. v. Knoblauch,67 the Supreme Court of Canada restored the conditional sentence of a trial judge, which included an order that required
Knoblauch to reside in a secure mental health institution. Knoblauch
had a long history of mental illness, and had threatened to use hazardous
explosives. The Court held that even very dangerous offenders could receive conditional sentences,68 if the judge concludes that the community’s safety would not be endangered because of the conditions imposed.
Arbour J. concluded that since Knoblauch’s dangerousness was a com65

It is assumed that those who are not responsible for their actions shouldn’t be “punished” for
them, whereas dangerous offenders are held responsible for their crimes.

66
This principle from Winko is applied in Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre v. Ontario
(A.G.), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 498, and its companion case Pinet v. St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital,
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 528.
67
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 780, [2001] 2 W.W.R. 201.
68

The Court stresses that the conditional sentencing provisions (s. 742.1) do not exclude “dangerous offenders” from access to conditional sentences. Presumably, this does not include ineffect of s. 753(4), but refers instead to offenders who have engaged in dangerous activities
more generally. Knoblauch was not a designated dangerous offender.
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bination of his mental illness and his access to explosives, if the latter
is precluded, the risk disappears. Incarceration similarly eliminates the
danger, but does little to address the mental illness. The Court asserted
that this methodology might allow mentally disordered offenders to take
advantage of resources available in the community.
4. Summary
Because of their perceived risk to the safety of the community, individuly dangerous, the court will order an assessment by a forensic mental
health expert. The individual circumstances of the accused should be
considered in context as a factor in determining the risk that they pose.

II. THE PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT OF DANGEROUSNESS
as a dangerous offender, the court will order an assessment performed
by a forensic expert,69
on the sentencing disposition. There can be a great deal of variation in
how an individual assessor chooses to perform this task, in part because
there are numerous psychological measures that have been designed for
of various forensic assessment techniques. Then, we will examine two
competing systems used in evaluating whether an individual is prone
to dangerous behaviour, the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (currently the DSM-IV)70 diagnosis of
Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD
of psychopathy using his Psychopathy Checklist⎯Revised (PCL-R).71 In
the vast majority of dangerous offender applications, one or both of

69
70

Criminal Code, supra note 9 at s. 752.1(2).

American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
4th ed. (Washington, DC: APA, 1994).
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these methods will be utilized. They will be described and critiqued

lifetime of institutionalization.
1. Predicting Violence: A Brief History
Prior to the 1970s, “dangerousness” was not of much interest to forensic
scientists. It was assumed that those involved in the administration of
justice knew which individuals deserved particular attention because
of their violent propensity. In 1974, however, Steadman and Cocozza72
published the results of their study that followed 98 patients who were
abruptly released from detention, or into less secure conditions, despite
73
After two to three
years, only about 20% were arrested, and about 2% had become involved
in violent acts. This drew attention to the “false positive problem,” the
notion that the prevalence of dangerousness was drastically over-perceived.74 Steadman and Cocozza concluded that predicting violence was

71

See Robert D. Hare, Manual for the Hare Psychopathy Checklist—Revised (Toronto: MultiHealth Systems, 1991).
72

Henry J. Steadman & Joseph J. Cocozza, Careers of the Criminally Insane: Excessive Social
Control of Deviance (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974).
73
See Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). Baxstrom was civilly committed at the conclusion of his criminal sentence because the authorities considered him too dangerous to be released. Baxstrom petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, which the U.S. Supreme Court granted,
and held that he had been denied the equal protection of jury review that was available to others
who were civilly committed in the State of New York. Warren C.J. wrote: “The capriciousness

expiration of a penal sentence. A person with a past criminal record is presently entitled to a
hearing on the question whether he is dangerously mentally ill so long as he is not in prison at
the time civil commitment proceedings are instituted. Given this distinction, all semblance of
inmates in hospitals for the criminally insane were transferred to civil hospitals. Eventually
about half of these were released into the community. See further discussion in Christopher D.
Webster et al., The Violence Prediction Scheme: Assessing Dangerousness in High Risk Men
(Toronto: Centre of Criminology, 1994) at 2.
74

See Christopher D. Webster & Gerard Bailes, “Assessing Violence Risk in Mentally and Personality Disordered Individuals” in Clive R. Hollin, ed., Handbook of Offender Assessment and
Treatment (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 2001) 71 at 72.
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to predict events that occur with only a low frequency.75
tinguished between clinical and actuarial prediction. He argued that
certain demographic variables, such as past crimes and socio-economic status, are correlated to future dangerousness. However, he viewed
mental illness as uncorrelated to the risk of future violence. Monahan
tors and outcomes.
In response to the demand from mental health and correctional prothors based at the Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre in Ontario
developed The Violence Prediction Scheme.77 Using sophisticated statistical techniques, the authors evaluated data on approximately 600 men
who had committed at least one violence offence. They were followed
up over a seven-year period. In creating the Violence Risk Appraisal
Guide (VRAG), they determined which factors were most correlated
with engaging in violence after release. These factors, including such
characteristics as elementary school maladjustment, could be compared
to determine an offender’s relative risk.
There was some dissatisfaction with these early efforts, because
studies showed that they generally had a low reliability. Clinicians desired a universal and systematic tool to utilize in completing their assessments. The DSM-IV and the PCL-R both promised to offer advances
in this regard.
76

75

But see Saleem Shah, “Dangerousness: Conceptual, Prediction, and Public Policy Issues”
in J. Ray Hays, Thomm Kevin Roberts & Kenneth S. Solway, eds., Violence and the Violent
Individual (New York: Spectrum Publications, 1981) 151. Shah claims that saying something
is
is not the same as saying it is impossible, and that it is unlikely that all clinicians are
generally poor at assessing risk for violence. See also Webster & Bailes, supra note 74 at 73.
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John Monahan, Predicting Violent Behaviour: An Assessment of Clinical Techniques (Beverly
Hills, Cal.: Sage, 1981).
77

See Webster et al., supra note 73.
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2. The DSM-IV: Antisocial Personality Disorder
The authors of the DSM emphasize that the assessment of any disorder
should focus on publicly observable behaviours, because these are the
only features that are amenable to reliable assessment.78 Based on this
by a “pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of
others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues into
adulthood.”79 It labels this condition Antisocial Personality Disorder
(APD).
Because of the poly-thetic approach to categorization in the DSM,
the diagnosis can be made in a vast number of ways. Research has reported that there are a total of 32,647 variations in the DSM-IV.80 Despite this, some supporters of the DSM diagnosis have argued that APD
is the only personality disorder to consistently achieve high levels of
reliability in practice.81
A task force committee of the American Psychiatric Association decided the content of DSM criteria for APD.82 As Hart and Hare point out,
however, the criteria do not constitute a scale or a test.83 Instead, the
clinician determines if a given criterion is present or absent⎯
decision is either no diagnosis, or a lifetime label of APD. Additionally,

of these methods.

78

See e.g. Stephen D. Hart & Robert D. Hare, “Psychopathy: Assessment and Association with
Criminal Conduct” in David M. Stoff, James Breiling & Jack D. Maser, eds., Handbook of Antisocial Behavior (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1997) 22.
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Supra note 70 at 645.
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Richard Rogers et al., “Prototypical Analysis of Antisocial Personality Disorder: A Study of
Inmate Samples” (2000) 27 Criminal Justice and Behavior 256.
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For a review, see e.g. Scott O. Lilienfeld, Cynthia Purcell & Jacqueline Jones-Alexander,
“Assessment of Antisocial Behaviour in Adults” in David M. Stoff, James Breiling & Jack D.
Maser, eds., Handbook of Antisocial Behavior (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1997) 60.
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In fact, all criteria in the DSM is based on consensus. See E. H. Marcus, “Unbiased Medical
Testimony: Reality or Myth?” (1985) 6 Am. J. For. Psych. 3. An example of this process in action occurred in 1973, when it was decided to remove homosexuality from the list of disorders
based on a vote of the trustees and a 60% vote of the membership.
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The DSM-IV lists three major criteria and several subcriteria for an
disregard for the rights of others since the age of 15, indicated by factors
such as impulsivity, reckless disregard for the safety of self or others,
lack of remorse, and failure to conform to social norms with respect
to lawful behaviour; (b) a current age of at least 18; and (c) evidence
of Conduct Disorder (another DSM diagnosis involving traits such as
aggressiveness, destructiveness, and deceitfulness) before the age of
15.84 This misconduct must not have occurred during a schizophrenic
or manic episode. The DSM also notes that these individuals often lack
gant self-appraisals. The diagnosis is much more common in males, and
tends to be related to low socio-economic status. Overall prevalence in
community samples is about 3% in males, and 1% in females, however,
the rates are higher in forensic settings. The disorder also tends to remit
with age, particularly by the forties.
Despite, or perhaps because of, this seemingly black-and-white apAPD has received a great deal of criticism. It
is not clear that a diagnosis as complex as “antisocial personality” can
be made using a categorical method. The DSM permits no degrees of
disorder⎯the criteria for diagnosis are met, or they are not. Some researchers have suggested that psychopathy or antisocial personality is
better conceived of as a dimensional construct, with traits existing in all
individuals to a greater or lesser degree.85 A dimensional model may allow for greater precision in classifying offenders who exhibit a myriad
of personality traits and behaviours.
Another serious concern is the reality that the DSM diagnosis of
APD suffers from both over- and under-inclusiveness. Chronic antisocial
behaviour in adults may be due to a wide variety of factors, but the DSM
has virtually equated APD with chronic criminality. As one researcher
has pointed out, “almost any offender in a correctional setting is hypothetically entitled to a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder.”86
84

APA, supra note 70.

85

See e.g. Hart & Hare, supra note 78.

86

Hans Toch, “Psychopathy or Antisocial Personality in Forensic Settings” in Theodore Millon et al., eds., Psychopathy: Antisocial, Criminal, and Violent Behavior (New York: Guilford
Press, 1998) 144 at 149 [emphasis in original].
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also encompasses a variety of conditions in addition to those traditionally associated with psychopathy, including such guiltless traits as
cultural deviance. White noted that APD is also complicated by substance
abuse.87 The diagnosis co-occurred with alcohol abuse 15.5 times more
often than expected by chance. Some symptoms of APD, such as arrests,
may be the direct result of the substance abuse, rather than the personality disorder. In fact, one study estimated the prevalence of APD in males
generally by age 30 at 47%.88
On the other hand, some researchers have argued that the DSM is
under-inclusive, providing a narrow conceptualization of APD.89 The diagnosis may fail to detect true psychopaths who have managed to avoid
a great deal of contact with the legal system⎯in other words, the truly
“successful” psychopaths.90 Furthermore, the aggressive conduct that
APD tends to be rare in women, which may result in them receiving an alternative diagnosis such as Borderline Personality Disorder,
when in fact APD may be more appropriate.
APD

were made.91 Although certain personality traits used by Hare and others promoting the alternative Psychopathy model were recognized, they
were relegated to “associated features.” Rogers emphasized the fact that
the conception of APD as outlined in the DSM needs to be re-examined.
It is interesting to note the following warning given by the American
Psychiatric Association in the DSM itself:
87

Helene Raskin White, “Alcohol, Illicit Drugs, and Violence” in David M. Stoff, James Breiling & Jack D. Maser, eds., Handbook of Antisocial Behavior (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons,
1997) 511.
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See Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, “Antisocial Personality Disorder and Psychopathy: Diagnostic Dilemmas in Classifying Patterns of Antisocial Behavior in Sentencing
Evaluations” (1998) 16 Behav. Sci. & L. 333.
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See e.g. Lilienfeld, Purcell & Jones-Alexander, supra note 81.
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See also Thomas F. Oltmanns & Robert E. Emery, Abnormal Psychology, 2d ed. (Upper
Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1998) at 343. The authors note that the DSM-III was highly
criticized for blurring the distinction between antisocial personality and criminality; it was difdirection of including many more criminals within the boundaries of the disorder. The DSM-IV
partially responded to this by moving back to some of the original traits suggested by Cleckley
(infra note 93), but at the expense of greater reliability.
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[W]hen the DSM-IV categories, criteria, and textual descriptions
of DSM-IV in forensic settings should be informed by an awareness
92

3. The PCL-R: Psychopathy
we now know as psychopathy.93 For decades, Hare and his colleagues
developed and attempted to validate a reliable rating scale that could
tap the key features of this condition.94 The PCL-R uses expert observer
ratings, based on a review of case histories and records, supplemented
by interviews and behavioural observations, to make a diagnosis. The
Revised version includes 20 items, designed for use with an adult male
forensic population. Items are scored on a 3-point scale (from 0 = item
does not apply to 2 =
). Total scores range from
0 to 40, and a score of 30 is conventionally accepted as indicating the
presence of psychopathy. The scale has an internal structure, divided
into two factors. Factor 1 corresponds to interpersonal and affective features (e.g.,
e.g.,
chronically unstable lifestyle).95
In the Canadian correction system, risk assessment for the purposes of conditional release, treatment, and dangerous offender hearings
typically include an evaluation of psychopathy using the PCL-R. These
assessments are based on a structured interview as well as historical in96
Some authors have even suggested that a failure
to consider psychopathy when conducting a risk assessment may be un92

Supra note 70 at xxiii.
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Hervey M. Cleckley, The Mask of Sanity (St. Louis, Mo.: Mosby, 1941).
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For details of the psychometric properties of the PCL-R, see Hare, supra note 71. For an
overview of psychometric assessment in forensic settings generally, including the PCL-R, see
Gisli H. Gudjonsson, “Psychometric Assessment” in Clive R. Hollin, ed., Handbook of Offender
Assessment and Treatment (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 2001) 111.
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Michael Woodworth & Stephen Porter, “In Cold Blood: Characteristics of Criminal Homicides as a Function of Psychopathy” (2002) 111 Journal of Abnormal Psychology 436.
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Stephen D. Hart, “The Role of Psychopathy in Assessing Risk for Violence: Conceptual and
Methodological Issues” (1998) 3 Legal and Criminological Psychology 121.
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reasonable (from a legal perspective) and unethical (from a professional
perspective).97 The use of the PCL-R in dangerous offender hearings was
discussed in William Head Institution v. Canada (A.G.),98 where the
judge noted that the scale can be used to predict recidivism, and even
suggested that, despite Dr. Hare’s recommendation, assessors possessing only a Master’s degree should be permitted to perform PCL-R assessments for the purposes of the criminal justice system.99
Hare describes psychopathy as a chronic mental condition associ100
tioning. Psychopathy is understood as a cluster of personality traits,
including remorselessness, callousness, deceitfulness, egocentricity,
cial charm, and externalization of blame.101 This is exhibited as a pera lack of respect for the rights of others, and of social norms and rules.
Clinically, a psychopath is “a dangerous person who preys on others
across the life span.”102
A diagnosis of psychopathy has been associated with aggressive
tendencies. A number of studies have linked higher PCL-R scores with
violent behaviour. For example, one study showed a violent re-offence
rate of 0% for nonpsychopaths, 7.3% for a mid-level group, and 25% for
psychopaths. Failure rates (recidivism) were 40% for nonpsychopaths,
and 85% for psychopaths.103 Similarly, in one study, the violent recidivism rates of mentally disordered offenders from a maximum-security
psychiatric hospital were compared over a 10-year follow-up period. A
total of 40% of the inmates committed a violent offence. However, the
total for those considered psychopathic was 77%.104
97

(2003), 237 F.T.R. 127, 2003 FC 780.
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Ibid. at para. 23.
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See e.g. Hart & Hare, supra note 78.
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Behavior 577.
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psychopathy with that of criminality. Criminal conduct refers to behav105

Criminal conduct is much more pervasive in society than psychopathy, and some even consider it normal behaviour for those at certain
points in development and in given social circumstances.106 However,
Hart and Hare claim that there is a clear link between psychopathy and
crime, in that many psychopaths do engage in chronic criminal conduct,
and tend to do so at a high rate and early in their life. Because of this,
psychopaths are responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime in
society. Crimes committed by these individuals tend to be serious and
the behaviour is persistent; many psychopaths are considered “career
criminals.”107
Psychopaths are also considered “high-density” offenders.108 They
tend to commit offences at a relatively high rate (when they are not
incarcerated), and they commit a wide variety of offences. Studies have
shown that highly psychopathic offenders had an average offence rate
that was more than double that of those who rated low on the PCL-R.
Hare suggested that in general, psychopaths tend to be more criminally
active than nonpsychopaths across all variables studied.
The literature provides little evidence that psychopaths respond favourably to treatment, or at least, that an effective treatment program
has ever been developed. In fact, some evidence has suggested that
treatment may actually make psychopathic offenders worse. It is possible that psychotherapy helps these individuals to improve their manipulation and deception skills by giving them insight into human behaviour
in general without really learning anything about themselves. Psychopaths also seem adept at appearing to improve over the course of treatment, in order to become candidates for early release, only to re-offend
105

See e.g.

-

there are two types of antisocial behaviour. One type, adolescence-limited antisocial behaviour,
is a common, adaptive form that disappears by the time the person reaches adulthood. This type
is unrelated to APD or psychopathy, but presumably accounts for most antisocial behaviour.
Life-course-persistent antisocial behaviour is exhibited by relatively few individuals.
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Hart & Hare, supra note 78.
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Robert D. Hare et al., “Psychopathy and the Predictive Validity of the PCL-R: An International Perspective” (2001) 18 Behav. Sci. & L. 623.
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shortly after re-entering the community.109 However, the main basis of
these beliefs, a study conducted at the Penetanguishene forensic hospithe researchers included radical, unconventional components. Patients
were required to spend up to two weeks in “nude encounter groups”
where they were fed through tubes in the walls, and were administered
LSD, alcohol, and other substances in order to disrupt their aloofness
and hostility, increase their anxiety, and make them chemically dependent so they would be more “accessible” for treatment.110 Clearly, such
treatment is completely inappropriate. Recent research has suggested
that psychopaths do experience some improvement with treatment, al111

The PCL-R was developed as an alternative to the diagnostic method
employed in the DSM. However, there is a strong association between
a PCL-R
APD,112 with the
major difference being in prevalence rates. DSM criteria estimate the
presence of APD in up to 80% of offenders. The PCL-R, however, suggests
that only 15-30% of this same population are psychopathic.113 These
study noted:
Mental health experts performing forensic assessments for
sentencing purposes often describe defendants as displaying
Antisocial Personality Disorder…or some variation of the term.
This diagnosis may have a profoundly aggravating effect on
sentencing considerations, particularly in creating expectations that
no rehabilitation is possible and that future criminal violence is
inevitable…. In this regard, APD as a diagnostic construct becomes
114
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For a discussion of this, see Skeem, Monahan & Mulvey, supra note 101 at 579.
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Hart & Hare, supra note 78. As the authors point out, about 90% of those diagnosed with the
PCL-R criteria meet DSM criteria for APD as well, but only about 30% of APD offenders meet
PCL-R criteria for psychopathy.
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The authors further advised that:
Psychopathy [measured by the PCL-R] is emerging as a discrete
clinical entity which may be more precise and reliable than APD in
also apply to psychopathy. Research supports a probabilistic rather
than an absolutist application of the concept.115

4. Summary
In completing a dangerousness assessment, mental health professionals
use a variety of techniques. The most popular are the DSM diagnosis
of APD, and the PCL-R analysis of psychopathy. The PCL-R is currently
the most reliable risk assessment tool available; however, no forensic
assessment technique can predict dangerousness with a very high level
of accuracy.

IV. MAKING THE CASE AGAINST THE USE OF PSYCHIATRIC
ASSESSMENTS IN COURT
1. Unreliability of Assesments
Christopher Slobogin noted the irony inherent in the law of dangerousness.116 In April 1983, the District of Columbia’s Superior Court ruled
in In re Wilson,117 that psychiatric testimony on risk of future dangerousness was too unreliable to be used in civil hospital commitments. At the
same time, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Barefoot v. Estelle,118 held the same type of testimony trustworthy enough to support
a death sentence. In Barefoot, the petitioner was convicted in a Texas
The Supreme Court denied his habeas corpus petition, on the basis that
115
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there was no merit to his argument that psychiatrists are incompetent to
predict with acceptable reliability that a particular criminal will commit
future crimes. White J. held that there was no violation of the Constitution, and, indeed, “prediction of future criminal conduct is an essential
element…[of] our criminal justice system.”119 Amazingly, this was despite the position of the American Psychiatric Association (APA), who,
of three predictions of long-term future violence made by psychiatrists
are wrong. The APA further argued that “a layman with access to relevant statistics can do at least as well and possibly better” in predicting
dangerousness.120 One of the State’s psychiatrists asserted that he was
“100% sure” that an individual with the characteristics described to him
in a hypothetical would commit acts of violence in the future.121
Ultimately, and especially with regard to the criminal law process,
it is not helpful to decide if an individual is “dangerous” in the abstract.
What we really want to determine is whether a person will engage in
socially unacceptable behaviour, so detrimental to the community, that
criminal and a “dangerous” one is, at best, vague, and yet the power
ton noted, “[i]n reality, psychiatrists may be given the ultimate power of
judge and jury in deciding both admission and discharge from places of
indeterminate detention.”122
Ronald Blackburn commented that “it has become apparent that neither clinicians nor behavioural scientists have demonstrated the ability
to distinguish clearly between those who are likely to exhibit dangerous
behaviour and those who are not.”123 In his survey of the data, Monahan
summarised the results of several attempts to identify which offenders
119
120
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released from institutions would commit violent crimes. He found that
between 54% and 99% of those predicted to be dangerous did not subsequently commit such crimes.124 Blackburn noted that in light of such
125
can criminal justice system.
psychiatrists and the courts overestimated the risks of dangerousness,
and one author noted that psychiatrists might be responsible for “restraining three or four patients in order to prevent one from committing
another violent [offence].”126 Similar concerns have also been expressed
in the Canadian criminal law context.127
In their renowned criticism of psychiatric expertise, Ennis and Litwack concluded:
[T]here is literally no evidence that psychiatrists reliably and
accurately can predict dangerous behaviour. To the contrary,
such predictions are wrong more often than they are right. It is
inconceivable that a judgment could be considered an “expert”
128

Concerned with the use of these predictions in American death penalty
cases, Ewing argued that the rendering of these predictions by mental
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ated with these professions.129 He urged psychiatrists and psychologists
to adopt an ethical ban on predictions of dangerousness where capital
sentencing was possible. One review of testimony given during capital
risk assessments listed numerous errors mental health professionals fell
prey to, including failure to consider context, over-reliance on clinical interviews, misapplication of psychological testing, and misuse of
patterns of behaviour.130 Noting the consequences of several of these
failings, Greenberg suggested that psychiatric diagnoses not be used in
forensic settings, and recommended instead an emphasis on functional
analyses.131
Eugenia La Fontaine asserted that due to the severity of the consequences, higher standards of reliability should be required when determining the admissibility of evidence during capital sentencing, and
that expert predictions of dangerousness in such cases are unconstitutional.132
2. Dissenting Opinions
There are, of course, those who hold contrary opinions. Randy Otto
claims that the empirical literature in this area has been misinterpreted.133
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Errors in Violence Risk Assessment at Capital Sentencing” (1999) 26 Criminal Justice and Behavior 20.
130

Stuart A. Greenberg, Daniel W. Shuman & Robert G. Meyer, “Unmasking Forensic Diagnosis” (2004) 27 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 1.

131

Eugenia T. La Fontaine, “A Dangerous Preoccupation with Future Danger: Why Expert Predictions of Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases are Unconstitutional” (2002) 44 B.C.L. Rev.
207. See pp. 208-10 for a fascinating discussion of Texas’s “Dr. Death,” Dr. James Grigson. As
of 1994, he had appeared in at least 150 capital trials on behalf of the state, and his predictions
of future dangerousness had been used to help convict at least one-third of all Texas death row
defendant would be dangerous in the future, and habitually refers to defendants as being in the
“most severe category” of sociopaths, referring to one individual as “above ten” on a scale of
one to ten. Indeed, in one case, he even claimed that the defendant presented a “one thousand
percent chance” of being a future danger.
132

Randy K. Otto, “On the Ability of Mental Health Professionals to ‘Predict Dangerousness’:
A Commentary on Interpretations of the ‘Dangerousness’ Literature” (1994) 18 Law & Psychol.
Rev. 43.
133

Ibid. at 64.

DISORDER IN THE COURT . . . 31

research that placed a limit on how accurate predictions could be, such
tions used to infer expert’s opinions). He claims that later efforts were
more successful. He remains guarded, however, when he suggests that
“mental health professionals have some ability to assess the risk that
although rates of error, remain considerable.”134
One recent study tracked the prison infraction records of Arizona
death-row inmates.135 The researchers concluded that inmates sentenced
to death might, in fact, be more dangerous than others, based on their
tendency to be involved in serious prison violence. Of course, living in
one’s life creates confounding factors.
legal contexts. Heilbrun136 suggested that in decisions relating to public
safety and rehabilitation, forensic assessments might be useful. Howvere punishment, are “clearly outside the domain of…expertise. Simply
stated, mental health professionals are not competent to address such
issues.”137
3. Summary
Many researchers have argued that due to the chronic uncertainty of
psychiatric predictions of dangerousness, such testimony should have
-
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Absent a major legislative reversal, psychiatric assessments in the criminal justice system are here to stay. The following recommendations are
offered in order to minimize socially detrimental errors, and in order to
make optimal use of the information that is available (however imperfect). These represent the most promising treatments for the current case
of disorder in the courtroom.
The opportunity for the Crown and defence to retain their own psychiatric experts should be reintroduced. These experts should be required
to defend their conclusions and the process by which they reached them.
An impartial court-appointed assessor should be made available in the
The use of the PCL-R in all forensic risk assessments should be required. The PCL-R has proven to be a more robust predictor of future
violence than other tools, such as the DSM-IV APD diagnosis. As the
PCL-R accounts for the greatest number of factors in an offender’s personal circumstances, it is most sensitive to the unique factual matrix in
each assessment of dangerousness.
Existing dangerous offender designations should be reviewed where
In changing the language in the Criminal Code from “observation” to
“assessment,” it is submitted that Parliament intended that the more
modern actuarial techniques be used, rather than the clinical observation
method. Offenders currently serving indeterminate sentences based on
less valid methods should receive a new hearing and assessment using
the PCL-R.
Parole reviews should be conducted a minimum of every 2 years
from the beginning of the sentence. Opportunities should be provided
to demonstrate a decrease in dangerousness resulting from psychological treatment, or the decrease in aggression generally exhibited with
age. Unnecessarily long prison sentences create a circular problem, as
the increasing effects of institutionalization virtually eliminate the opportunity to create a viable release plan. The Bill C-55 amendments,138
which increased the initial parole review period from three to seven
years, demonstrate that the potential for overly long sentences exists
from the moment of incarceration.
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in dangerousness that has occurred since the last review. Consequently,
new assessments should be ordered in response to potential rehabilitation of the individual inmate, instead of according to guidelines which
do not account for differences between individuals.
sensitive to individual factors. Following the line of reasoning that started with Neve and was continued with Winko and Knoblauch, the least
onerous restrictions, which still protect the public, should be imposed,
having regard to the particular circumstances of the offender and the
context in which his crimes were committed.

VI. CONCLUSION: MAKING THE MOST OF WHAT WE HAVE
idealizes, psychiatric assessments of future dangerousness are plagued
with uncertainty. This uncertainty is only compounded by taking this
information out of its context and thrusting it into the courtroom, where
it is presented by psychiatrists who have no legal training, and received
by judges who have never seen a copy of the DSM.
It is clear, however, that even the most reliable measure, the PCL-R,
is only moderately accurate, and its usefulness is still being tested in the
psychological literature. Despite these shortcomings, forensic assessCriminal Code mandates that an assessment be completed in determining whether an individual is one of those few offenders who are sufperiod.
The psychiatrist must not eclipse the role of the court in such cases.
As psychological risk assessments are based in large part on the offender’s criminal history, the judge must make his or her own evaluation of
should be limited to those areas in which they supplement, and not replace, the court’s judgment, such as in prospects for rehabilitation.
There are two main problems with the heavy reliance upon psychiatric predictions of dangerousness; a lack of consensus regarding methods, and the fallibility of the “objective” assessment tools that are most
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frequently utilized. This uncertainty begs the question of whether it is
appropriate for the government to impose such restrictive measures at
all⎯

